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NOTES
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF TREATING
END OF LIFE PATIENTS WITH RISKY PAIN
MEDICATION AND THE ROLE OF THE
EXTREME EMERGENCY SITUATION
Gina Castellano *
This Note examines the legality of physicians treating patients near the
end of life with risky pain medication, specifically during an extreme
emergency situation. The issues discussed include whether such treatment
should be criminalized and, if criminalized, what standard should be used
to determine culpability. This Note proposes that physicians should not be
shielded from the criminal justice system, but that the standard of double
effect intent should be expressly adopted in the adjudication of such cases.
INTRODUCTION
I don't know if there's any way for me to describe to you how intense the
heat was .... It was relentless. It was suffocating. It made it extremely
difficult to breathe. And with the heat came the terrible smell from all of
the human waste and the fact that we didn't have water.I
Dr. Anna Pou, quoted above, appeared on 60 Minutes on September 24,
2006, to defend her actions at Memorial Medical Center in New Orleans
during the devastation of Hurricane Katrina. As Katrina headed toward
New Orleans, Dr. Pou, a head and neck surgeon who specializes in cancer
treatment, began her shift at Memorial Medical Center.2 She remained at
the hospital for four days.3
* J.D. Candidate, 2008, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2005, Georgetown
University. I would like to thank Professor Deborah Denno for her thoughtful guidance and
my father for his unwavering support.
1. 60 Minutes: Was It Murder? Doctor, Two Nurses Were Accused of Murdering
Patients (CBS television broadcast Sept. 24, 2006) [hereinafter Was It Murder?], available
at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/09/21/60minutes/printable2O3O603.shtml (quoting
Dr. Anna Pou) (internal quotations omitted).
2. See id.
3. See id. Dr. Pou remained with her patients even though she was offered the chance
to leave. Id.
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Lifecare Hospitals leased the seventh floor of Memorial Medical Center
to operate a long-term acute care unit.4 The doctor assigned to the Lifecare
patients did not show up during the hurricane, so Dr. Pou and two nurses
did the best they could to treat as many patients as possible. 5 "[W]ith New
Orleans flooded, a credit union being looted across the street and gunshots
heard outside, hospital staff members had concluded that some patients
were simply not going to leave the building alive." 6 At least thirty-four
patients died at Memorial Medical Center in the days following Hurricane
Katrina.7
On July 17, 2006, Dr, Pou and nurses Cheri Landry and Lori Budo were
arrested in connection with four counts of second-degree murder stemming
from the health care of four terminally ill patients at Memorial Medical
Center. 8 Following the arrest, the only information available regarding the
murder charges came from news reports and the affidavit for the arrests
released by the office of Louisiana Attorney General Charles C. Foti. 9 The
four patients included a paralyzed 61-year-old male who weighed 380
pounds, an 89-year-old female who suffered from dementia and gangrene, a
90-year-old female who appeared stable before the storm, and a fourth
patient about whom there is no specific information. 10
The arrest affidavit alleged that Dr. Pou committed second-degree
murder "on or about September 1, 2005, by intentionally killing multiple
patients by administering or causing to be administered, lethal doses of
morphine sulphate (morphine) and/or midazolam (Versed), at Memorial
Medical Center.""II The affidavit ended with the findings of the forensic
pathologist who reviewed the medical results and test analyses of the four
patients who died. According to the affidavit, the forensic pathologist
"advised that in all four cases it appeared that a lethal amount of morphine
was administered." 12 Furthermore, it was alleged that "none of the four
patients were being administered morphine or midazolam for their routine
pharmaceutical care requirements." 13
4. Affidavit of Virginia B. Rider at 1 (July 2006), available at
www.nola.com/katrina/pdf/072006 nolacharges.pdf.
5. See Was It Murder?, supra note 1.
6. Christopher Drew & Shaila Dewan, Louisiana Doctor Said to Have Faced Chaos,
N.Y. Times, July 20, 2006, at A]8.
7. See id.
8. See Adam Nossiter & Shaila Dewan, Patient Deaths in New Orleans Bring Arrests,
N.Y. Times, July 19, 2006, at Al.
9. See Affidavit of Virginia B. Rider, supra note 4; see also National News, Wash.
Post, Nov. 21, 2006, at A5 (describing the district judge as being "frustrated by the time he
has spent on this case" and telling prosecutors that the doctor and nurses "should be charged
or exonerated").
10. See Denise Grady, Medical and Ethical Questions Raised on Deaths of Critically Ill
Patients, N.Y. Times, July 20, 2006, at A18.
11. Affidavit of Virginia B. Rider, supra note 4, at 1.
12. See id.
13. Id.
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At a press conference following the arrests, Mr. Foti said, "This is plain
and simple homicide."' 14 Dr. Pou defended herself vehemently: "I do not
believe in euthanasia. I don't think that it's anyone's decision to make
when a patient dies .... What I do believe in is comfort care and that
means that we ensure that they do not suffer pain."'
15
It is impossible to understand what Dr. Pou and nurses Landry and Budo
were thinking as they made medical decisions for the hospital's sickest
patients during a national emergency. Although what was going through
their heads may never be publicly known, and the reports of what exactly
went on at Memorial Medical Center are sketchy, a doctor at a nearby
hospital, faced with a similar horrific situation, shed light on the situation
with his recollections:
At Charity Hospital, not far from where Dr. Pou was working, I and
nearly 60 other staff doctors, nurses, and residents were stuck in a hospital
without electricity, without water, without food, for five days with about
340 patients, 50 of them critically ill. We had no ability to use ventilators,
so we had to squeeze ambu bags by hand to get air into their lungs. We
had no monitoring equipment, no X-ray, no laboratory, no dialysis.
Compounding all this, we were unable to have families at the bedside-or
even available by phone-to participate in treatment decisions for the
sickest patients. It was very, very difficult.
16
Dr. Pou's lawyer, Richard T. Simmons, Jr., explained to reporters the
situation at Memorial Medical Center:
[T]he sickest patients could not have been evacuated on the inflatable
boats being used .... [T]o take patients to the roof for helicopter rescues,
orderlies had to squeeze them through a 3-foot-by-3-foot hole in a hospital
wall and push them on gurneys up the ramps of the parking garage before
carrying them onto the roof.
17
The reports of the incident give the rest of the world a sense of the dire
situation that Dr. Pou faced. Yet without being there and being responsible
for other lives, it is almost impossible to prove what decisions Dr. Pou
made and what her intent was when making those decisions. On July 24,
2007, a grand jury refused to indict Dr. Pou.1 8
14. See Nossiter & Dewan, supra note 8.
15. See Was It Murder?, supra note 1. Dr. Pou continued, "No, I did not murder those
patients.... I've spent my entire life taking care of patients. I have no history of doing
anything other than good for my patients. I do the best of my ability. Why would I suddenly
start murdering people? This doesn't make sense." Id.
16. Ben deBoisblanc, It Was Heroism, Not Homicide, During Katrina, Time.com, July
25, 2006, http://www.time.com/time/nation/printout/0,8816,1218776,00.html. Dr.
deBoisblanc is a critical care expert who cared for fifty critically ill patients for five days
during the hurricane. See id.
17. Drew & Dewan, supra note 6. It can be inferred that this was not an option for the
380-pound paralyzed male patient.
18. Adam Nossiter, Grand Jury Won't Indict Doctor in Hurricane Deaths, N.Y. Times,
July 25, 2007, at A10; see also Mary Foster, Prosecutor Drops Case Against 2 Nurses in
Four Post-Katrina Deaths, Wash. Post, July 4, 2007, at A7. The charges against nurses Lori
2007]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
This Note analyzes the legality of a doctor's decision to use risky pain
medication in treating critically ill patients during an extreme emergency.
In examining the legality of physicians aggressively treating patients in a
manner that may ultimately cause death, the intent of the physician is the
general standard used to determine culpability. 19 Intent, as defined by
Black's Law Dictionary, is "the state of mind accompanying an act."
Criminal intent is defined as "[a]n intent to commit an actus reus without
any justification, excuse, or other defense." Intent to kill is "[a]n intent to
cause the death of another." 20
It is acknowledged that intent is a vague standard. In Louisiana,
"second-degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender
has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm."'21 As defined by
statute, "Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists when the
circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed
criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act."'22 Thus, if the
case against Dr. Pou had gone to trial, to convict her the prosecution would
have had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she actively desired to
kill her patients. This Note does not speculate as to Dr. Pou's intent during
her actions; instead Dr. Pou's story will serve as the backdrop to the
challenge of analyzing end of life medical decisions during extreme
emergency situations.
This Note concludes that, however difficult it is to determine a
physician's intent, it is the most practical standard to use in determining a
physician's culpability with regard to the deaths of his or her patients. The
caveat is that the doctrine of double effect must be employed during the
extreme emergency situation.23 In brief, double effect provides that an
actor with good intentions is not responsible for the unintended bad
effects.24 Practically, in the case of Dr. Pou, as long as she intended to ease
the pain of her patients and not cause death, even though death resulted, she
would not be culpable. The opposition to the double effect intent standard,
as it will be referred to in this Note, is great. Some argue that double effect
allows people to get away with murder by professing that they only
intended to ease pain, while their actual intent was to kill. 25 Others argue
that the intent to ease pain is either the same as simply intending to put one
Budo and Cheri Landry were dropped earlier in July 2007. Jim Avila & Mary Kate Burke,
Katrina Doctor Not a Murderer, Grand Jury Says, ABC News, July 24, 2007,
http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=3409526.
19. See, e.g., Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 801-02 (1997).
20. Black's Law Dictionary 825-26 (8th ed. 2004).
21. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:30.1 (2007).
22. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:10. This Note relies on the Louisiana definition of intent.
23. See infra Part II.B. 1.
24. See Edward C. Lyons, In Incognito-The Principle of Double Effect in American
Constitutional Law, 57 Fla. L. Rev. 469, 471 (2005); Susan Nuccetelli & Gary Seay,
Relieving Pain and Foreseeing Death: A Paradox About Accountability and Blame, 28 J. L.
Med. & Ethics 19, 20 (2000).
25. See Thomas A. Preston, Physician Involvement in Life-Ending Practices, 18 Seattle
U. L. Rev. 531, 539 (1995).
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out of one's misery or inclusive of double intent both to cause pain and to
kill.2 6
This Note evaluates the ethical and policy reasons for criminalizing such
action and whether or not intent to hasten death should remain the standard
in an extreme emergency situation. Part I of this Note examines the legal
status of end of life decisions-specifically euthanasia, physician-assisted
suicide, terminal sedation, and risky pain medication. The legal analysis
will serve not only as background information to the controversy
surrounding end of life decisions but also as a means of emphasizing the
role of intent in drawing the line between what is and is not criminalized in
the U.S. judicial system. Part II focuses on the controversy surrounding the
criminalization of death-hastening pain medication and the standard of
determining criminality, namely double effect intent. Finally, Part III of
this Note uses the legal analysis provided in Part I and the controversy
presented in Part II to determine how the legal system must react during the
next extreme emergency situation. This Note concludes that criminalizing
the use of ultimately fatal pain medication is necessary to protect patients,
but must be based on the double effect intent standard so as to provide
protection for the brave physicians who choose to stay and attend to
patients during extreme emergency situations. It is hoped that such a
combination places enough faith in both the medical profession and the
legal system to achieve the unity between the two that is necessary in
handling extreme emergency situations.
The issue of physician culpability for patients' deaths during extreme
emergency situations has yet to be analyzed in academia. The failed
indictment against Dr. Pou has removed it from further consideration by the
criminal justice system. This issue is pressing to society today, as the
Unites States is confronted with terrorism, avian flu, and natural disasters.
It is urgent that the law find a solid basis with which to address these
horrific situations in a legal, fair, and organized manner. This Note aims to
prompt a discussion among both the medical community and the legal
system to ensure that doctors are properly advised and patients adequately
protected before another horrific emergency occurs.
I. EUTHANASIA, PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE, TERMINAL SEDATION,
AND PAIN MEDICATION
Part I focuses on the legality of end of life decisions. Most notably, this
part analyzes treatment of physician-assisted suicide by the U.S. Supreme
Court and the legal gray area of terminal sedation and risky pain
medication. As will become apparent, intent of the physician is the theme
that governs the criminalization of end of life situations such as euthanasia,
physician-assisted suicide, terminal sedation, and risky pain medication.
26. See Norman L. Cantor, On Hastening Death Without Violating Legal and Moral
Prohibitions, 37 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 407, 423 (2006).
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This Note addresses the spectrum of situations, attempting to locate where
valid medical treatment crosses the line to criminal conduct.
One can view both terminal sedation and risky pain medication as not
involving the intent to cause death. However, as per its definition, intent to
cause death is an essential element of euthanasia. Physician-assisted
suicide is possibly the murkiest area, specifically because the act is done by
the patient, so the intent of the patient and not that of the physician is most
relevant. These distinctions provide the structure for the legal spectrum of
the end of life decisions, which are explored below. Part I ends with the
presentation of the argument for and against criminalizing risky pain
medication. The legal status of the other three situations is raised in Parts II
and III to provide analogies and determine the necessity of the intent
element.
A. Euthanasia
Euthanasia is the administration of a lethal agent to a patient by another
person to relieve "the patient's intolerable and incurable suffering." 27
Euthanasia falls to the far side of the spectrum, representing illegal conduct.
Within the broad definition of euthanasia, there are three specific
categories. The "more acceptable form" of euthanasia is active voluntary
euthanasia, where a person acts to end the patient's life at the request of the
patient.28 Nonvoluntary euthanasia refers to the situation where the patient
is unable to consent to the lethal agent due to either temporary or permanent
incompetence. 29  "[I]nvoluntary euthanasia is where the patient is
competent but has not consented to the treatment."' 30 No form of euthanasia
is legal in the United States, as all involve the intent to kill.
The strongest argument against euthanasia is the slippery slope. If active
voluntary euthanasia is allowed, heath-care providers may slide from
"simply assisting terminally ill patients meeting strict criteria who want to
end their lives ... to more insidious conduct, such as the 'mercy' killing of
helpless and disabled individuals who have not consented, or who are
incapable of consenting to being euthanized. ''3 1  So the slippery slope
argument is that if voluntary euthanasia is decriminalized it will lead to the
acceptance of nonvoluntary and involuntary euthanasia. 32
27. Code of Ethics E-2.21 (Am. Med. Ass'n 2005), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/8458.html.
28. Stephen W. Smith, Evidence for the Practical Slippery Slope in the Debate on
Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, 13 Med. L. Rev. 17, 23 (2005).
29. Id. at 23-24.
30. Id. at 24.
31. Michael E. Clark, Oregon's Death with Dignity Act and Alleged Patient Euthanasia
After Hurricane Katrina-The Government's Role, Health Lawyer, Feb. 2006, at 1, 5 (2006).
In 1994, Oregon's Death with Dignity Act (ODWDA) legalized assisted suicide. See infra
Part I.B.
32. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 732-33 (1997) ("[T]he State
may fear that permitting assisted suicide will start it down the path to voluntary and perhaps
even involuntary euthanasia.... Thus, it turns out that what is couched as a limited right to
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B. Physician-Assisted Suicide
Physician-assisted suicide occurs when a physician provides the
necessary means and/or information to enable a patient to commit suicide. 33
Physician-assisted suicide is only legal in one state, Oregon. 34  The
constitutionality of a patient's right to die exemplifies the struggle with the
legality of physician-assisted suicide, the value of the patient's will in the
debate, and the current law on the issue in the United States.
In 1997, the Supreme Court held in Washington v. Glucksberg that there
is no constitutional right to suicide or to assisting suicide. 35 In Glucksberg,
the Court decided that the state of Washington's ban on assisted suicide did
not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 36
In Vacco v. Quill,37 another physician-assisted suicide case decided the
same term as Glucksberg, plaintiffs argued that, because New York allowed
refusal of life-sustaining treatment, New York's assisted suicide ban
violated the Equal Protection Clause. 38 The Supreme Court rejected this
argument, holding that the state's ban on assisted suicide and the statute
permitting patients to refuse medical treatment were consistent and did not
"draw any distinctions between persons."' 39 The Court also noted the
differences in causation and intent that separate refusal of lifesaving
treatment from physician-assisted suicide.4 0
'physician-assisted suicide' is likely, in effect, a much broader license, which could prove
extremely difficult to police and contain.").
33. Code of Ethics E-2.211 (Am. Med. Ass'n 2005), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/8459.html.
34. See infra notes 41-49 and accompanying text; see also Code of Ethics E-2.21 I (Am.
Med. Ass'n) ("Physician-assisted suicide is fundamentally incompatible with the physician's
role as healer, would be difficult or impossible to control, and would pose serious societal
risks.").
35. Washington, 521 U.S. at 728 ("The history of the law's treatment of assisted suicide
in this country has been and continues to be one of the rejection of nearly all efforts to permit
it. That being the case, our decisions lead us to conclude that the asserted 'right' to
assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause.").
36. See id. at 728. "[Tlhe asserted 'right' to assistance in committing suicide is not a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause." Id. at 735; see also
Norman L. Cantor & George C. Thomas III, The Legal Bounds of Physician Conduct
Hastening Death, 48 Buff. L. Rev. 83, 86 (2000) ("While the Supreme Court ruled that
continued punishment of assistance to suicide withstands federal constitutional challenge,
the Court by no means ended debate about the precise legal bounds of diverse techniques for
facilitating death or about the soundness of current legal distinctions.").
37. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
38. See id. at 798.
39. Id. at 800 ("Everyone, regardless of physical condition, is entitled, if competent, to
refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment; no one is permitted to assist a suicide.").
40. See id.
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In 1994, Oregon became the first state to legalize assisted suicide. 41
Under Oregon's Death with Dignity Act, 42 strict criteria must be followed
in order for a patient to receive from a physician the controlled substances
that will cause the patient's death.43 A patient must have an incurable,
irreversible disease that will cause death within six months.44 The patient's
request must be voluntary and informed, and a second physician must
confirm the first physician's conclusions. 45  Lastly, but perhaps most
importantly, "physicians may dispense or issue a prescription but may not
administer it." '46
In 2001, U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft attempted to limit legal
assisted suicide in Oregon by issuing an interpretive rule that stated that
physician-assisted suicide violated the federal Controlled Substances Act.47
The Supreme Court ruled, however, that the attorney general does not have
the "power to effect a radical shift of authority from the States to the
Federal Government to define general standards of medical practice in
every locality. ' 48 So, in the end, physician-assisted suicide was upheld in
Oregon solely on federalism grounds. 49
Physician-assisted suicide also presents a slippery slope argument: If
physician-assisted suicide is legal, it will not be a last resort, but instead
become a preferred course of treatment and lead to euthanasia. 50 Professor
Stephen Smith attempts to refute the slippery slope argument. 51 Professor
Smith, after analyzing the full reports located on the Oregon Department of
Human Services web site,52 did not observe an increase in voluntary or
involuntary euthanasia. 53 He does admit, however, that his conclusions
may be premature and that more evidence may emerge that offers support
for the slippery slope argument. 54
41. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 249 (2006) ("ODWDA, which survived a
1997 ballot measure seeking its repeal, exempts from civil or criminal liability state-licensed
physicians who, in compliance with the specific safeguards in ODWDA, dispense or
prescribe a lethal dose of drugs upon the request of a terminally ill patient.").
42. Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 127.800-995 (West 2003).
43. See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 250-51.
44. See Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 127.800(12), 127.805(1).
45. See id.
46. See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 252.
47. Id. at 253-54.
48. Id. at 275.
49. See id.
50. See Smith, supra note 28, at 24. Some people go even further and argue that the
acceptance of physician-assisted suicide will result in "Nazi-style death camps." Id. at 23.
51. See id. at 43-44.
52. See Oregon Death with Dignity Act,
http://www.dhs.state.or.us/publichealth/chs/pas/pas.cfn (last visited Sept. 4, 2006).
53. See Smith, supra note 28, at 44.
54. See id.
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C. Terminal Sedation
Terminal sedation is the "administration of sedatives sufficient to render
a dying patient somnolent during the remainder of the dying process."
55
There are three general categories of terminal sedation.56  The first is
sedation accompanying the removal of life support.5 7 The second "involves
deep sedation to unconsciousness or stupor toward the end stage of a dying
process." 58 The last, and most controversial, is the same as the second
method except no artificial nutrition or hydration is provided once the
patient in unconscious.59  The actual cause of death is uncertain.
60
The third type of terminal sedation requires the most complex legal
analysis. Although there is no legal precedent, terminal sedation advocates,
who argue that terminal sedation is legal, focus on the intent of the
physician: relieving suffering and not causing death. 6 1 Others are not
convinced by the intent distinction and argue that "the actual intention of
the cooperating physician is probably not just to relieve suffering." 62 As
will become apparent, much of the debate over terminal sedation revolves
around the same issues as risky pain medication, namely whether or not the
intent of the physician should be the standard for criminalization. This
Note only examines the criminalization of administering lethal doses of
pain medication, but most of the arguments presented apply to terminal
sedation as well.
D. End of Life Care and Pain Medication
The administration of pain medication to a terminally ill patient is legal.
There are, of course, a few notable exceptions that can turn normal end of
life care into a risky practice, especially if death-hastening drugs are used.
Legally, health-care providers are allowed to treat pain with medication
even when that medication poses a risk of hastening a patient's death.
63
A brief general overview of the medicine used to treat patients suffering
great pain is necessary. Opioid analgesics are the main drugs used to
manage cancer-related pain.6 4 Morphine is an opioid.65 The most serious
55. Cantor & Thomas, supra note 36, at 138.
56. See Cantor, supra note 26, at 418-20.
57. Id. at418.
58. Id. at419.
59. Id. at 420.
60. Id. ("The underlying disease, the sedation, and dehydration accompanying cessation
of ANH [artificial nutrition and hydration] are all candidates for cause of death.").
61. See, e.g., Rob McStay, Terminal Sedation: Palliative Care for Intractable Pain,
Post Glucksberg and Quill, 29 Am. J.L. & Med. 45, 52 (2003) (arguing that in Vacco v.
Quill the U.S. Supreme Court laid the "legal groundwork" for terminal sedation).
62. Cantor, supra note 26, at 421.
63. See Norman L. Cantor, Twenty-Five Years After Quinlan: A Review of the
Jurisprudence of Death and Dying, 29 J.L. Med. & Ethics 182, 186 (2001).
64. See Ann Alpers, Criminal Act or Palliative Care? Prosecutions Involving the Care
of the Dying, 26 J.L. Med. & Ethics 308, 310 (1998).
65. See id.
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adverse effect of the administration of strong opioids is respiratory
depression.66  In treating pain, physicians also routinely use
benzodiazepines, for example, Versed.67 When opioids are combined with
benzodiazepines, they "act to cause more severe respiratory depression and
a simultaneous drop in blood pressure." 68
In administering pain medication, physicians must follow certain
guidelines. "These guidelines require that any risky pain relief be
necessary-i.e., that the pain be intractable; that less dangerous, but
effective analgesics not exist; and that the dosage be titrated upward in a
careful fashion." 69 More important possibly than adherence to the technical
guidelines is the intent of the health-care provider: "The practice is
generally considered acceptable, even if it does help end a life-provided
that the intention is strictly to relieve pain, not cause death. Basically, it's
O.K. if you happen to grease the skids for poor old uncle as long as you
didn't really mean to." 70 In a case like that of Dr. Pou, a jury would have to
find that she actively desired the death of her patients. 71
The use of potent pain medication to relieve the suffering of a patient is
considered "an integral part of medical responsibility. '72 Many medical
sources argue that the use of opioid analgesics is a safe and necessary
practice and that patients build tolerance to the substances. 73
In determining how to legally handle risky pain medication during an
emergency situation, two debates must be addressed. First, there is the
view that medical judgment and not the criminal justice system should
determine the manner in which doctors treat their patients. 74 If this view is
accepted, the criminal justice system is excluded, doctors are shielded from
criminal liability, and patients are at the mercy of their doctors' decisions.
If the criminal justice system retains its authority in regulating behavior,
the second debate-which standard should be used to determine
culpability-must be resolved. Determining the standard during the
extreme emergency situation is thoroughly complex. If the physician
intends death, the answer is clear: the physician has performed some form
66. See id.; Howard Brody, Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Courts: Moral
Equivalence, Double Effect, and Clinical Practice, in Law at the End of Life: The Supreme
Court and Assisted Suicide 101, 106 (Carl E. Schneider ed., 2000) (noting that "the dosage
level at which one can achieve pain relief and the level at which respiratory depression might
occur are much farther apart than traditionally has been appreciated").
67. See Alpers, supra note 64, at 310.
68. Id.
69. Cantor, supra note 63, at 186.
70. Denise Grady, The Fuzzy Gray Place in the Killing Zone, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13,
2006, at WK3.
71. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
72. Cantor & Thomas, supra note 36, at 110; see also Lois Shepherd, Assuming
Responsibility, 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 445, 446 (2006) (arguing that responsibilities to the
suffering are "primitively" understood and need to be further explored and taken more
seriously).
73. See, e.g., Cantor & Thomas, supra note 36, at 110.
74. See, e.g., Phebe Saunders Haugen, Pain Relief for the Dying: The Unwelcome
Intervention of the Criminal Law, 23 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 325, 363 (1997).
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of euthanasia, which is illegal in the United States.75 However, determining
intent becomes all the more complicated in extreme emergency situations.
In feeling a compulsion to act because a patient is suffering extreme pain, a
physician may not have the time, equipment, or staff necessary to follow
proper protocol. Furthermore, a physician may be fearful for his or her own
life and not just the life of the patient he or she is presently treating, as well
as all patients and staff in the hospital.
Part II of this Note examines the controversy over which legal standard
should apply to criminalizing end of life risky pain medication cases.
Incorporated into each issue is the possibility that the traditional arguments
may lean more to one side than the other, or even be inapplicable, in
extreme emergency situations.
II. THE CRIM1NALIZATION OF ADMINISTERING
RISKY PAIN MEDICATION AND THE UNCHARTED TERRITORY OF
THE EXTREME EMERGENCY SITUATION
This part analyzes the arguments for and against criminalizing risky pain
treatment and the debate over using double effect intent as a standard. The
controversy has not yet reached the Supreme Court, although it has been
discussed in the Court's dicta and concurring opinions regarding other end
of life issues.76  As such, the controversy is based on public policy
arguments and ethical considerations. The following analysis applies these
arguments to the extreme emergency situation, exploring its effect on the
debate.
A. The Controversy over Criminalizing Risky Pain Treatment
This section analyzes the general controversy over criminalization,
namely whether the criminal law of the United States is clear enough to
determine whether a physician commits a crime in prescribing pain
medication or if medical judgment in such a situation should be somewhat
shielded from the reach of the law. Part II.A. 1 presents the argument
formerly embraced by Louisiana Attorney General Charles C. Foti that the
use of aggressive pain medication by Dr. Pou and nurses Landry and Budo
is homicide and must be treated as such by the state criminal justice
system. 77 The justification for this argument lies in the belief that such
actions must be criminalized due to the traditional rubric of protecting
patients and, more broadly, the American stance against euthanasia. Part
II.A.2 presents the argument that criminal law should not encroach upon the
medical judgment of physicians, with justifications lying in the expertise of
the profession and the belief that criminalizing leads to the under treatment
of pain.
75. See supra Part I.A.
76. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 801-02 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 737-38 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
77. See Nossiter & Dewan, supra note 8.
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1. Criminal Law Prohibits End of Life Decisions and Protects Patients
a. Murder Is Murder
Just as euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide are illegal in the United
States, save in Oregon, 78 the argument can be made that criminal law
should govern the risky pain treatment of patients by their physicians. In
past cases, as discussed in Part II.B.2.b of this Note, traditional state
criminal murder statutes have been used to determine the culpability of
physicians in treating their patients with risky pain medication. 79 As such,
it can be argued that the Louisiana second-degree murder statute would
have applied in the case of Dr. Pou if it had gone to trial. The Louisiana
statute defines second-degree murder as the killing of a human being when
the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.80
There are no specifications on the mechanism that must be used; morphine
is the same as a gun. 81 All that is necessary to determine culpability is for
the jury to find that the physician had the specific intent to kill his or her
patients. 82 If Dr. Pou had gone to trial and the prosecution had proved that
she actively desired to kill her patients, she would have been convicted of
second-degree murder and would have been punished under the traditional
system accordingly.
b. The Consequences: If This Treatment Is Not Criminalized,
the Slippery Slope Will Lead to Euthanasia
The argument for criminalizing such behavior centers on the belief that,
if not criminalized, the lives of near-death patients will be jeopardized by
the acts of their physicians. The same arguments made against physician-
assisted suicide can be made against legalizing the use of death-hastening
pain medication. 83 Doctors will begin to substitute their judgment for that
of their patients, and the slippery slope will eventually transform the use of
aggressive pain medication into euthanasia. 84 Another argument is that, if
only medical judgment or the rule of double effect is used as a parameter,
those doctors with truly bad intentions may easily slip through the cracks. 85
The "escape the blame" argument, where a physician intends death but
simply says he or she intended to relieve pain, would, in effect, allow a
78. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., State v. Naramore, 965 P.2d 211,213 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998).
80. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. It should also be noted that
"[a]lthough jurisdictions may differ in the details, all states criminalize homicidal behavior
and, depending on a prosecutor's decision and the facts of the case, a physician may be
criminally liable for any act that grossly deviates from the standard of care and results in a
patient's death." Alpers, supra note 64, at 310.
83. See supra notes 31-50 and accompanying text.
84. See id.
85. See Cantor & Thomas, supra note 36, at 86.
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murderer to go unpunished and subject patients to the mercy of physicians
who do not have patients' best interests at heart.86
c. No Deviation Is Necessary During the Extreme Emergency Situation
As Louisiana Attorney General Foti made clear in a press release, the
criminalization argument embraces the belief that no special standard is
necessary during the extreme emergency situation.87 The slippery slope
presents the same problems during normal conditions as it does during the
extreme emergency situation. Patients are to be protected regardless of the
state of affairs, and the traditional state criminal statutes are adequate to
handle the matter-extreme emergency or not.
2. Criminal Law Is Not Adequate: Medical Judgment Must Reign
Supreme to Protect Physicians and Patients Alike
Doctors and commentators have expressed the view that a doctor's
decision regarding his or her patient's pain medication at the end of life
stage, as long as it is made in good faith, should be free from criminal
liability. 88 In terms of the extreme emergency situation, physicians have
been vocal in responding to the Dr. Pou story and defending her medical
judgment.89 Part II.A.2.a discusses the views of the medical profession,
first generally in regard to the criminalization of risky pain medication and
then specifically in regard to the case of Dr. Pou. Part II.A.2.b analyzes the
consequences for patients of criminalizing such action and the likelihood
that criminalizing will increase the levels of unbearable pain that patients
will have to face during the end of life stage.
a. The Sentiment of the Medical Profession
In the literature focusing on the use of pain medication, doctors assert the
view that aggressive pain treatment is necessary and expected of the
medical profession: "[I]t is malpractice for physicians caring for severely
ill patients not to know how to use pain medicine, and not to use it
aggressively when a patient is dying in pain."90
86. See id.
87. See supra text accompanying note 14.
88. See, e.g., Haugen, supra note 74, at 363.
89. It should be noted that some commentators considered Dr. Pou's actions mercy
killing. See, e.g., Dr. Anna Pou-hero or murderer?,
http://nhsblogdoc.blogspot.com/2006/09/dr-anna-pou-hero-or-murderer.html (Sept. 26,
2006, 16:52 GMT). Mercy killing is prohibited in the United States, based on the notion that
"[a] ban on mercy killing is arguably a reminder of social veneration for life, even though
compassion for a suffering, dying person may tempt a health care provider or other observer
to relieve that suffering by any means possible, especially when the patient is requesting
such relief." Cantor, supra note 26, at 409.
90. Dr. Timothy E. Quill, Risk Taking by Physicians in Legally Gray Areas, 57 Alb. L.
Rev. 693, 694 (1994); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 748 (1997)
(Stevens, J., concurring) ("[F]or some patients, it would be a physician's refusal to dispense
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It can be argued that it is simply not the role of prosecutors to bring
charges against physicians making good faith decisions when treating pain
and suffering. 91 The justification for this argument lies not only in the
expertise of the medical profession but also in the duties owed to the
patient. "Patients in these extreme circumstances require and are entitled to
the fearless, aggressive efforts of their doctors to control their final pain and
suffering." 92
The President's commission report, written during the Reagan
administration, also defers to the medical judgment of doctors, noting that
physicians are not held to have violated the law when using potent pain
treatment because society places "importance o[n] defining physicians'
responsibilities regarding these choices and o[n] developing an accepted
and well-regulated social role that allows the choices to be made with due
care." 93 If the patient is terminal and there is no further treatment or actions
that can be taken to extend the life, then it is difficult to see how the
physician "deprive[s the patient] of meaningful life by the act."'94 The
physician is no doubt involved in the death, but "it is the disease that
deprives life."'95
In addition, the medical profession has set out its views on extreme
emergency situations.96 For example, the Louisiana State Medical Society
strongly supported Dr. Pou:
[T]he Louisiana State Medical Society . . . is confident that Dr. Pou
performed courageously under the most challenging and horrific
conditions and made decisions in the best interest of her patients. Her
recent statements regarding the events clearly show her dedication to
providing care and hope to her patients when all hope seemed
abandoned. 9 7
Other doctors proclaimed that Foti's allegations were "absurd" and, if
true, doctors would be charged with murder every day "because we use
medication to ease their suffering and make their death tolerable and dignified that would be
inconsistent with the [physician's] healing role.").
91. See Haugen, supra note 74, at 363. In reference to the use of morphine, Haugen
argues, "[H]ow best, how much, and when to administer [it] are peculiarly medical
decisions, with which the criminal law should not interfere, except in the most extraordinary
of cases." Id. at 364.
92. Id. at 363.
93. President's Comm'n for the Study of Ethical Problems in Med. and Biomedical and
Behavioral Research, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatments: Ethical, Medical and
Legal Issues in Treatment Decisions 79 (1983).
94. See Preston, supra note 25, at 540.
95. Id. Professor Preston suggests that a central problem with the relationships between
physicians and the death of their patients is the language used to describe the role of the
physician. Id. at 543. Physicians deny association with their patients' death because they do
not want to come close to the word "kill," and as a result the proper "linguistic expressions"
do not exist to describe the role of physicians in end of life treatment. Id.
96. The only resources available at this time are the general arguments that physicians
made surrounding the Dr. Pou case.
97. Press Release, Floyd A. Buras, President, La. State Med. Soc'y (Sept. 27, 2006),
available at http://www.lsms.org/Newsroom/LSMS%2OStmt%20on%2OAnna%2OPou.pdf.
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these drugs in combination all the time to give comfort. '98 Others alleged
that the problem during and in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina was not
the doctors who provided treatment and care but those who did not; in such
a horrific situation, the treatment administered by Dr. Pou, they argue, was
not only proper but necessary. 99
b. Patients Suffer If Such Treatment Is Criminalized
Adding to the argument against criminalizing a physician's use of
aggressive pain medication is that such criminalization will adversely affect
doctors' performance in treating their patients. A vital issue in the medical
field is the under treatment of pain. 10 0 It is currently possible, through
medical advances, to relieve as much as ninety percent of all patient pain,
yet more than fifty percent and possibly as much as seventy to eighty
percent of such pain is not alleviated.' 0' Medication is patient specific.
Thus, what works for one does not work for another. 02 Doctors have to
decide how to treat each individual specifically. The reasons for the under
treatment of pain include, but are not limited to: fear of discipline,
misunderstanding of addiction, government antidrug policies, and
inadequate education of health-care professionals. 103
98. deBoisblanc, supra note 16. Dr. Steven Miles, a professor of Medicine at the
University of Minnesota and expert on the care of terminal patients expressed that he was
"'fundamentally unconvinced of the framing of the story... [and] not inclined to believe
this is a euthanasia scenario or a physician-assisted suicide scenario."' Grady, supra note 10.
The Director of the Center for Bioethics at the University of Minnesota, Jeffrey Kahn,
expressed his belief that "' [it's hard ... to see the wisdom of prosecuting in a case like
this .... This is talking about being in extremis, in the worst possible conditions."' Id.
99. deBoisblanc, supra note 16 ("In the wake of Katrina if a patient had died in a
hospital without evidence of having received comfort care, I would question that
treatment.").
100. See Stephen J. Ziegler & Nicholas P. Lovrich, Jr., Pain Relief Prescription Drugs,
and Prosecution: A Four-State Survey of Chief Prosecutors, 31 J.L. Med. & Ethics 75
(2003).
101. See Beth Packman Weinman, Freedom from Pain: Establishing a Constitutional
Right to Pain Relief, 24 J. Legal Med. 495, 503-04 (2003); see also Amy J. Dilcher, Damned
If They Do, Damned If They Don't: The Need for a Comprehensive Public Policy to Address
the Inadequate Management of Pain, 13 Annals Health L. 81, 81-82 (2004).
102. See Ziegler & Lovrich, supra note 100, at 76 ("A dosage that works for one patient
suffering from chronic pain or for a patient near the end of life may be wholly inappropriate
for another, particularly when considering the length of treatment, the patient's underlying
illness or condition, and the pharmacokinetics of opioids."); see also Dilcher, supra note
101, at 116 ("Clinicians suggest that there is no maximal or optimal quantity of an opioid
analgesic drug for either chronic or cancer pain. The appropriate dose is one that relieves the
patient's pain without causing adverse side effects. In some instances, patients with severe
cancer pain may require 1200 to 1800 milligrams of oral morphine per day, while other
cancer patients may require a greater dosage of intravenous morphine at 1000 to 4500
milligrams per hour." (citations omitted)).
103. See Weinman, supra note 101, at 508; see also Dilcher, supra note 101, at 85-86;
Jeffrey Wishik, Chronic Pain: Medical and Legal Aspects, R.I. Bus. J., Nov.-Dec. 2004, at
23, 40 ("Fear of regulatory, disciplinary, and even criminal sanctions for over prescribing
opioids is pervasive among physicians."). For more on the under treatment of pain in
America, see Ben A. Rich, The Politics of Pain: Rhetoric or Reform?, 8 DePaul J. Health
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Physicians fear the consequences of administering high doses of pain
medication, and as a result patients needlessly suffer.104 "[C]onsiderable
anecdotal evidence ... has shown that some terminally ill cancer patients
have been medicated inadequately for pain, because their doctors have
feared being subjected either to criminal investigation or to an inquiry from
the state's medical licensing board." 10 5
Besides the effect that the fear of criminal or medical board
investigations has on the patient's care, it also has a significant effect on the
doctors. Although it is not the case that large numbers of physicians are
punished, "the impact of the process on those physicians who are only
investigated, or only charged but not disciplined, or only warned or
cautioned but not penalized is severe." 10 6 Reportedly, one physician took
early retirement as a result of an investigation into his prescriptions for pain
medication. 107
Pain is a crucial consideration under ordinary circumstances, but is of
extra significance during an extreme emergency situation. During an
extreme emergency situation, a doctor may be forced to work in
substandard conditions with inadequate equipment, insufficient staff
support, and threats to his or her health and safety. In such a situation, pain
may become unbearable for some patients. For example, Dr. Pou spoke of
providing "comfort care" during the days at the hospital. 108 One hundred
degree temperatures likely caused already poor medical conditions to
worsen and pain levels to rise dramatically. 10 9
Another problem may be that pain can go completely untreated during an
emergency situation. Referring to the attempt to criminalize Dr. Pou's
actions, one commentator suggested that "[t]here are a lot of doctors who
have a lot of problems with this .... It's going to have an impact on a lot
of people, because nobody is going to want to stay for a storm again." 10 If
doctors choose to leave during an extreme emergency, all pain can go
untreated. On the other hand, in an extreme emergency situation a doctor
Care L. 519 (2005). For an analysis of under treatment by nurses, see Marybeth Scanlon,
Providing End-of-Life Care in Connecticut: Should Nurses Fear Liability?, 5 Quinnipiac
Health L. J. 35, 40-43 (2001).
104. See Haugen, supra note 74, at 364.
105. Id. at 342. "To allow a patient to experience unbearable pain or suffering is an
unethical medical practice, and physicians should not allow exaggerated fears of legal action
to deter them from providing dying patients with aggressive, intensive palliative care." Id. at
363. The notable cases discussed in Part II.B.2.b may prove that physicians' fears are well
justified.
106. Sandra H. Johnson, Disciplinary Actions and Pain Relief: Analysis of the Pain
ReliefAct, 24 J.L. Med. & Ethics 319, 320 (1996).
107. See Weinman, supra note 101, at 510.
108. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note I and accompanying text. A comparison should be made with the
Capute case analyzed in Part II.B.2.b.
110. Drew & Dewan, supra note 6.
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who truly intends death may literally get away with murder if there is no
documentation and no witnesses to prove otherwise. I
B. Determining the Proper Standard for Drawing the Line
Between Medicine and Murder
At present, there is no definitive legal analysis of the acceptable
treatment of a dying patient's pain with risky pain medication. "[P]alliative
care guidelines tend to call for effective pain medication without specifying
whether there is an upper boundary, such as a dosage that will surely hasten
death."11 2  Without a definitive dosage, criminalization of the
administration of risky pain medication, where a physician does not admit
to intending to cause death, must rest on inferences and deductions based on
the facts of the specific case. Part II.B.1 presents the argument for using
intent as the proper standard, specifically as applied through the
philosophical doctrine of double effect, which the Supreme Court embraced
in its end of life decisions. 1 3 Part II.B.2 presents the arguments against
using intent as the proper standard, focusing on the fear that the doctrine of
double effect masks the true intent of a bad actor. Part II.B.2 concludes
with the practical problems of determining intent as illustrated by past
specific cases of doctors and nurses being investigated and/or charged with
murder in relation to aggressive use of pain medication.
1. Intent Is the Proper Standard
A physician's intent to cause the death of his or her patient by using risky
pain medication is the standard employed by the state of Louisiana to
determine whether or not the physician murdered the patient.' '4 Although
intent is widely used in order to determine culpability, determining an
actor's intent is a difficult and sometimes impossible feat. However, if a
lesser standard is used, the medical profession might not be able to
function; deaths of patients are an unavoidable element of the medical
profession, and, as such, the high standard of intent is necessary. 115 The
basic intent standard, however, is sometimes qualified with regard to the
medical profession. Supreme Court dicta suggest that the principle of
double effect is recognized within American jurisprudence and should be
employed when determining the culpability of a physician in regard to his
or her patient's death if caused by terminal sedation or pain treatment.11 6
111. See supra Part II.A.1 .b.
112. See Cantor, supra note 26, at 427.
113. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 801-02 (1997).
114. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
115. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., Vacco, 521 U.S. at 801-02.
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a. The Principle of Double Effect
The principle of double effect is traced back historically to Thomas
Aquinas."17  The doctrine proposes that in particular situations, it is
"permissible unintentionally to cause foreseen 'evil' effects that would not
be permissible to cause intentionally."'" 8 There are four elements of the
modem doctrine of double effect: (1) the agent only intends to bring about
a good; (2) foreseeable harms are unintended and not a means to that good;
(3) the intended means is morally permissible; and (4) the intended good is
proportionate to the unintended harm. 119
Ethicists in both medical and nonmedical1 20 fields use the principle of
double effect to justify certain actions.1 2 1 Although pertinent to other areas,
the principle of double effect may be considered essential to the field of
medicine: "[W]ithout it, surgery, for example, would be ethically
unacceptable."' 122  One notable caveat to the use of double effect
justification is that it should not be applied unless the actor has absolutely
no other alternative but to cause a harm in the attempt to fulfill a duty to
bring about a good.' 23 Additionally, an evil action cannot be the means of
securing a good consequence. 124
The principle of double effect is often invoked to explain why a
physician is allowed to administer high doses of opioids that have the effect
of causing death sooner than would occur naturally without administration
of the opioid.1 25 The argument is that when a doctor administers a high
dose of morphine, his intent is only to ease the patient's pain and suffering
and not to cause death.126 As such, the double effect doctrine applies, and
the doctor is not held morally accountable for the death of the patient.' 27
The doctrine of double effect can be viewed as good public policy
because "it allows physicians to provide adequate palliative care without
117. See Lyons, supra note 24, at 471 (citing Philip E. Devine, Principle of Double
Effect, in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 44, 44-45 (Robert Audi ed., 1995)).
118. Id.
119. See Nuccetelli & Seay, supra note 24, at 20. For a more theoretical explanation of
the four elements, see Lyons, supra note 24, at 482 (requiring that the act be "ethically
neutral, if not praiseworthy").
120. The standard example is when a pilot drops a bomb on a village to destroy a
munitions factory. See Richard S. Kay, Causing Death for Compassionate Reasons in
American Law, 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 693, 712 (2006). The pilot's intention is to shorten the
war and save lives. Id. It is a foreseeable consequence that innocent civilians in the village
will die as a result of his actions, but the deaths are morally justifiable under the doctrine of
double effect. Id.
121. Brody, supra note 66, at 105.
122. Id.
123. Daniel P. Sulmasy, Commentary, Double Effect-Intention Is the Solution, Not the
Problem, 28 J.L. Med. & Ethics 26, 28 (2000).
124. See Kay, supra note 120, at 694.
125. See Alpers, supra note 64, at 319.
126. See, e.g., Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 801-02 (1997).
127. See Alpers, supra note 64, at 319.
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engaging in clearly illegal conduct."' 128 The other options would either be
to allow intentional death or not to allow physicians to treat patients
aggressively when the treatment may cause death. 129 The former is murder
and the latter would leave patients without adequate pain relief.130
Therefore, the doctrine of double effect allows both the legal standard of
intent to remain in place and the public policy emphasis on reducing a
patient's pain to remain a role of the physician.131
b. The Supreme Court and the Role of Intent
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Glucksberg and Vacco has provoked
significant debate over the role of intent in end of life decision making.
According to former Chief Justice William Rehnquist, who wrote the
majority opinion in both cases,
[A] physician who withdraws, or honors a patient's refusal to begin, life-
sustaining medical treatment purposefully intends, or may so intend, only
to respect his patient's wishes and "to cease doing useless and futile or
degrading things to the patient when [the patient] no longer stands to
benefit from them.... The same is true when a doctor provides
aggressive palliative care; in some cases, painkilling drugs may hasten a
patient's death, but the physician's purpose and intent is, or may be, only
to ease his patient's pain. 132
In his opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted the role of intent as a means
to differentiate two actions that have the same result but deserve different
moral and criminal accountability. 133 The writings lead to the conclusion
that the majority opinion subscribes to the principle of double effect. 134
The concurring opinions go even further than invoking the principle of
double effect and leave open the question of a constitutional right to
choosing end of life treatment. 135
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor concurred in the judgments of Vacco and
Glucksberg because she agreed that there is no fundamental right to suicide,
but she notably saw "no need" to reach the question of "whether a mentally
competent person who is experiencing great suffering has a constitutionally
cognizable interest in controlling the circumstances of his or her imminent
128. McStay, supra note 61, at 54.
129. See id.
130. See id.; see also supra Part II.A.2.
131. See McStay, supra note 61, at 54.
132. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 801-02 (1997) (comparing a physician who withdraws
life-sustaining treatment or provides aggressive pain medication with a doctor who assists a
suicide and thus intends death).
133. See id. at 802-03 ("Put differently, the law distinguishes actions taken 'because of' a
given end from actions taken 'in spite of their unintended but foreseen consequences.").
134. See, e.g., Rebecca Dresser, The Supreme Court and End-of-Life Care: Principled
Distinctions or Slippery Slope?, in Law at the End of Life: The Supreme Court and Assisted
Suicide, supra note 66, at 83, 88.
135. See id.
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death."' 36 Both Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer joined
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in part. 137
Professor Rebecca Dresser argues that the opinions, taken together,
suggest a constitutionally protected right to receive adequate palliative
care.' 38 Professor Dresser goes on to emphasize the importance of the
decisions for physicians and patients alike.139 Although Professor Dresser's
arguments for a constitutionally protected right to receive adequate
palliative care seem to be a bit of a stretch considering the Justices'
reservations about overstepping the breadth of the questions posed before
them, 140 her reasoning for the importance of a right to palliative care is
crucial and lends itself to the argument against criminalization of risky pain
medication and in favor of medical judgment. According to Professor
Dresser, with a right to adequate palliative care, patients gain more
authority to determine their end of life treatment options and the clinicians
are shielded from liability. 141  "At a minimum, [the Supreme Court
Justices'] opinions indicate that patients' constitutional rights would be
violated if physicians forgoing life-sustaining treatment or administering
risky palliative care were prosecuted for those actions."' 142 Professor
Dresser notes, importantly, that the Justices fell short of setting up a
framework for determining when potentially deadly pain medication is
illegal. 43
c. Alternatives to the Double Effect Justification:
Responsibility Without Culpability
Professors Susan Nuccetelli and Gary Seay argue that the principle of
double effect does not justify the actions of physicians hastening death with
pain medication, specifically because physicians are aware of the
consequences and are thus responsible. 144 Even drawing that conclusion,
Professors Nuccetelli and Seay question whether such physicians should be
136. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 736, 737-38 (1997) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Justice Sandra Day O'Connor also appears to subscribe to the doctrine of
double effect, noting that patients in both Washington and New York can receive palliative
care even when such care "hastens death." See Michael P. Allen, Justice O'Connor and the
"'Right to Die ": Constitutional Promises Unfulfilled, 14 Win. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 821, 828
(2006) ("At the most basic level, Justice O'Connor's opinion can be cited for the proposition
that there may be a constitutional due process right to palliative care (i.e., pain management)
at the end of life.... In Glucksberg, pain management leading even to death might be a
constitutionally protected right.").
137. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 789 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 789 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
138. See Dresser, supra note 134, at 83 (including both pain medication that could hasten
death and terminal sedation).
139. See id.
140. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 737-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
141. See Dresser, supra note 134, at 88.
142. Id. at 87-88.
143. See id. at 88.
144. See Nuccetelli & Seay, supra note 24, at 21.
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held morally accountable for the deaths.' 45 They therefore analyze other
options for justifying palliative care.
Professors Nuccetelli and Seay propose a "Principle of Conflicting
Duties": A person is exempt from blame when he simultaneously fulfills
one and violates another moral duty.146 If the duties fulfilled and violated
are equal and the person does his best to fulfill the first duty and cannot
prevent leaving the second obligation unfulfilled, his or her actions are
justified. 147  Although this proposed analysis seems to justify the
physician's actions, Professors Nuccetelli and Seay argue that it does not.1
48
According to the authors, a physician has co-existing, conflicting duties to
extend life and relieve pain, neither of which can be dismissed. 149 Unlike a
situation where not fulfilling a duty is excusable because another duty is
fulfilled, "[w]hen moral duties are special duties such that an agent is
obligated to fulfill them even if he is unable to do so, he could not be
exempt from blame by the Principle of Conflicting Duties."150
One assumes that in coming to this conclusion Professors Nuccetelli and
Seay would find no justification for a physician who causes death through
the use of pain medication while only intending to ease pain. Yet,
somewhat troublingly, the professors take no stand on the issue.1 51 While
noting that some obligations cannot be dismissed, they "do not rule out the
possibility that one or another of these duties might sometimes be
overridden in the clinical context where the requirements of humane and
compassionate care warrant it."' 152 This conclusion might actually serve as
an appropriate standard for use during extreme emergency situations. It is
possible that Professors Nuccetelli and Seay's condition of the "humane
and compassionate care" is satisfied during the emergency situation, where
the situation is dire for all, not just the patients. However appropriate such
a standard may be, the authors, in rejecting double effect, subscribe to the
notion that the physician intends death, based on the assumption that a
skilled professional can foresee the consequences of his or her actions. 153
Just like many other professionals, physicians are faced with tremendous
risks everyday and to presume intent, solely because a physician is a
145. Compare Nuccetelli & Seay, supra note 24, at 22 (noting that there are certain
situations where there are general moral duties and people do not have that much control),
with Sulmasy, supra note 123, at 27 ("No serious proponent of the [rule of double effect]
says that someone who has hastened the death of a patient is not responsible for that
outcome.").
146. See Nuccetelli & Seay, supra note 24, at 22.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 23.
149. See id. at 22.
150. Id. at 23.
151. See id. at 24.
152. Id. ("[T]he clinician must take into account all of her relevant professional
obligations in that situation and weigh them in deciding how to do what is best for that
patient, all things considered, given his values and beliefs, with a reasonable assessment of
what the quality of his remaining life is likely to be.").
153. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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physician, would be a mistake. Such a high standard would be both unfair
and unworkable.
Professor Roger Magnusson proposes another alternative to the doctrine
of double effect. Using the metaphor of "the devil's choice,"' 54 Professor
Magnusson describes "a moral dilemma that arises in circumstances where
choice itself is perverse and not choosing is not an option."'155 In applying
this concept to the field of medicine, where there is no "right choice," it is
imperative that the standards of medical ethics not be silent but instead help
the physician to determine and act upon the "least perverse alternative."' 156
Although Magnusson's point seems valid, it does not translate well to
criminal law. According to the legal system, one either follows or breaks
the law-there is no in-between. Unless there exists a rubric to which both
the medical profession and the criminal justice system adhere for
determining first the "least perverse alternative" and deciding not to
criminalize it, such a proposal will not be effective.
Professor Magnusson also proposes invoking the necessity defense when
a physician is faced with the devil's choice. 157 The necessity defense is
only appropriate, according to Professor Magnusson, when the choices were
"perversely constrained so that [the physician] felt compelled to adopt a
compassionate course even though this had a life-shortening effect."' 158 As
long as the physician has administered "recognized, analgesic drugs" and
done so "in dosages that were a proportionate response to the patient's
suffering," the action of hastening death is justified. 159  Professor
Magnusson believes the necessity defense is a better alternative to
analyzing the culpability of the physician. 160 As the necessity defense
presupposes that the physician intended to cause the death, 161 it is outside
the scope of this Note. It may be relevant in future extreme emergency
situations, when a physician, in stark contrast to Dr. Pou, admits that he or
she caused patients' deaths but nonetheless seeks exoneration. The
physician's intent to end an individual's life, however, lends itself much
more to euthanasia than to "comfort care," especially given the American
stance against euthanasia.' 62 This point, although outside the reach of this
Note, deserves adequate consideration by the criminal justice system.
154. See Roger S. Magnusson, The Devil's Choice: Re-thinking Law, Ethics, and
Symptom Relief in Palliative Care, 34 J.L. Med. & Ethics 559, 564 (2006).
155. Id.
156. See id. at 565.
157. See id. at 566.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 567.
160. See id. ("The defense of necessity immunizes palliative care practices that accord
with accepted and responsible professional practice, while permitting law and ethics to better
acknowledge the gravity and consequences of these end-of-life decisions.").
161. See id. at 566.
162. See supra Part I.A.
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2. Intent Is Not the Proper Standard
Intent as the standard to determine culpability, specifically as applied
through the doctrine of double effect, has many adversaries. 163  The
argument against the double effect intent standard centers on the idea that
intent is too high and difficult of a standard to prove and is dangerous to the
lives of patients.164
a. The Doctrine of Double Effect Allows for Murder
Challenges to finding a justification for hastening death with pain
medication abound. Objections to the doctrine of double effect include
arguments that the doctrine originated with the Roman Catholic religion,
whose tenet that intentionally causing death is always wrong does not enjoy
universal acceptance. 16 5 In addition, critics argue that intent is too difficult
to determine, so people are held responsible for both the intended and
unintended consequences of their actions. 166 Finally, the double effect
theory is critiqued for its reliance on the physician's intent, rather than that
of the patient. 167
Other challenges are that the principle of double effect is an avenue to
escape blame even when the physician intended death. 16 8 The argument is
that physicians are experts and when they act, they know the consequences
of their actions: "If a physician knows with a high degree of probability
that an act will result in death, the physician who performs that act intends
the death, regardless of a stated primary intent to relieve pain."' 69 The
argument against use of the doctrine of double effect folds neatly into the
argument that hastening death with pain medication is murder. 170
Some believe that the intent to relieve horrible suffering of a dying
patient is inherently commingled with the intent to put that patient "out of
his misery."' 17 1 Also, basing culpability on intent is problematic because
"[t]he palliative care provider either strains to keep his or her mind off what
may be the real objective of hastening death or later simply asserts that his
or her mind was so tuned."' 172
163. See, e.g., McStay, supra note 61, at 54; Preston, supra note 25, at 539.
164. See infra note 166.
165. See McStay, supra note 61, at 54.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See, e.g., Preston, supra note 25, at 539.
169. Id.
170. See supra Part II.A. 1.
171. See Cantor, supra note 26, at 423 (arguing that "distinguishing intent to relieve
suffering from intent to cause death is a mission impossible"); see also Grady, supra note 70
("Anyone who has watched a lingering, painful decline knows that the urge to provide
comfort is often mixed with a wish that it would just be over. Boundaries can blur, and
breach, in desperate moments. Moral concern can rise when dosages do.").
172. Cantor & Thomas, supra note 36, at 115.
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Professor Norman Cantor argues that intent alone is not the standard of
criminal law and bases his arguments on the Model Penal Code's
provisions. 173 The Model Penal Code defines murder as purposefully or
knowingly causing the death of another human being or recklessly causing
death "under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value
of human life."' 174 Cantor argues accordingly that the intent to relieve pain
"does not exculpate a person for a killing"; 17 5 the mens rea of knowingly
causing death is sufficient to find murder, despite the objective of relieving
pain. "In short, even with a primary intention to relieve suffering, a
physician does not have carte blanche to administer pain relief medication
that risks hastening death."'1 7
6
Professor Cantor, however, does note the concurring opinions of the
Supreme Court Justices in Glucksberg and Vacco, and admits that they
appear to indicate the opposite viewpoint-specifically that intent to ease
pain is relevant.' 77 He argues that this interpretation of the law seems
incorrect because such reasoning would allow a person to commit suicide
by having a vital organ removed if his or her primary intention is to save
another person's life. 178  Furthermore, he argues that it is harder to
distinguish such action from euthanasia when euthanasia is defined as the
administration of a lethal agent to a patient by another person to relieve "the
patient's intolerable and incurable suffering."' 179 Cantor's point is well
taken, yet as previously discussed, intent to cause death by a lethal agent is
not defined. In Dr. Pou's case, medical professionals stated that the mixture
of medications could be lethal depending on the dosage and incremental
increases. 180 If a medication's potential lethality is left undefined, then
once again, the determining factor of culpability lies solely in the intent of
the actor.
b. Practical Problems with Finding Intent
In addition to the argument that intent is not the proper standard because
it is too high of a threshold and allows bad actors to get away with murder,
there also exists the argument that it is simply too difficult to prove. The
case law indicates that the law is not as clear as some have suggested. The
following are a few notable descriptions of cases illustrating the ambiguous
173. See Cantor, supra note 26, at 423-25.
174. Model Penal Code § 210.2(l)(6) (1985).
175. Cantor, supra note 26, at 425.
176. Id. (noting, however, that the endorsement is only "dictum in concurring opinions").
177. See id. (referring to the concurrences of Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, David
Souter, and Stephen Breyer in Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 702, 736-38 (1997)).
178. See id. at 426.
179. Id. at 427 (citing Code of Ethics E-2.21 (Am. Med. Ass'n 1996), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/8459.html); see also Cantor & Thomas, supra
note 36, at 113 (noting that proponents of legalizing active euthanasia argue that it has
already been legalized through risky pain treatment).
180. See supra Part II.A.2.a.
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nature of prosecuting doctors and nurses for risky pain medication. 181 The
grand jury's failure to indict Dr. Pou simply adds to this list.
In 1981, nurse Anne Capute was charged with murdering a suffering
patient with a large dose of morphine. 182 Capute was a hospital licensed
practical nurse. 183 She had carefully documented her actions. 184 Capute
administered 195 milligrams of morphine within seven hours of her
patient's death. 185 The district attorney alleged that Capute intended to
kill. 186 During the murder trial, her defense attorneys argued that disease
caused the patient's death. 187 Capute spoke for herself: "No one here...
not yourselves, not my lawyer, not the district attorney, can possibly
imagine the pain and agony she was going through because they weren't
there. But I was." 188  The jury deliberated and acquitted Capute of
murder. 189  Accordingly, the prosecutors failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Capute intended death. Given her testimony, it is
easy for a layperson to understand how the prosecutor lost the case.
Another case involved the criminal investigation of Sharon LaDuke, a
registered nurse in New York. 190  LaDuke was investigated for
administering an unspecified large dose of Fentanyl, an anesthetic, to a
seventy-six-year-old patient with lung disease and pneumonia. 19 1  The
patient's family supported the nurse's actions but an investigation was
initiated, and LaDuke was fired even though the investigation produced
insufficient evidence to charge her with murder. 192
In Connecticut, a cardiothoracic surgeon ordered a resident to deliver a
morphine dose of seventeen times the last one administered to the
patient.' 93 The patient's death was ruled a homicide, yet the state's attorney
did not prosecute the surgeon "due to lack of proof of his criminal
181. In the United States, most chief prosecutors are elected officials, serving both as a
law enforcement official and officer of the court. See Stephen J. Ziegler, Physician-Assisted
Suicide and Criminal Prosecution: Are Physicians at Risk?, 33 J.L. Med. & Ethics 349, 349
(2005). Prosecutors are often described as "'gatekeepers' to the administration of justice"
because they have the discretion to determine whether a person gets charged with a crime.
See id. In deciding whether or not to charge a person with a crime, the primary factor
influencing the prosecutor is whether he believes that he can secure a conviction. See Ziegler
& Lovrich, supra note 100, at 78. "If the distinction between aggressive pain relief and
hastened death is a point of contention among physicians and ethicists, what can we expect
from prosecutors who are likely less knowledgeable about pain relief and end-of-life care?"
Id. at 76-77.
182. See Haugen, supra note 74, at 354.
183. See Scanlon, supra note 103, at 52.
184. See Haugen, supra note 74, at 354.
185. See id.
186. See Scanlon, supra note 103, at 52-53.
187. See id. at 53.
188. Nurse Calls Overdoses an Effort to Ease Pain, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1981, at A24.
189. See Scanlon, supra note 103, at 53.
190. See id. at 54.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See id. at 55.
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intent." 194 The last case is clearly less persuasive than those of Capute and
LaDuke, yet the inability to prove intent may demonstrate that there was
none-although other inferences are possible and justified.
Perhaps the most potent case is that of Dr. Lloyd Naramore, a Kansas
physician, who was charged with the attempted murder of Ruth Leach and
the first-degree murder of Chris Willt. 195 Ruth Leach was a seventy-eight-
year-old cancer patient, who was degenerating quickly. 196 The morphine
patches being used were not strong enough and Naramore, after discussions
with the Leach family, administered Versed, a painkiller, and Fentanyl. 197
Leach's respiration slowed, and Naramore told the family he could reverse
the effects with a different drug, Narcan. 198 The nurse assisting Naramore
testified that she believed Narcan was only used in cases of an overdose.199
Naramore then spoke with Leach's son who said that he did not want the
doctor to hasten his mother's death. Naramore then decided to remove
himself from the case. 200 Leach was transferred at her son's request to
another hospital, where she died a few days later.20 1
Willt was an eighty-one-year-old obese diabetic with a history of heart
disease. 20 2 He suffered a severe stroke, and Naramore believed him to be
brain dead.20 3 Although Willt had some movement, Naramore diagnosed it
as seizure activity and, after obtaining the opinion of a second doctor, he
stopped mechanical ventilation. 20 4
A jury found Naramore guilty of attempted murder and first-degree
murder and sentenced him to concurrent terms of five to twenty years. 205
However, his convictions were later reversed on appeal. 206 In his appeal,
Naramore argued that there was insufficient evidence to support his
convictions: "[T]he State's experts conceded the amounts given to Mrs.
Leach did not indicate a clear intent to kill."' 20 7 Two physicians involved in
the treatment of the patients and three other physicians testified that
Naramore's treatment was "medically appropriate." 208 The Kansas Court
of Appeals held that there was strong testimony that Naramore's actions
194. Id. at 55-56.
195. State v. Naramore, 965 P.2d 211, 213 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998).
196. Id. at213-15.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 215.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 216.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 217.
205. Id. at 213.
206. Id. ("We can find no criminal conviction of a physician for the attempted murder or
murder of a patient which has ever been sustained on appeal based on evidence of the kind
presented here.").
207. Id. at 221.
208. Id. at 223. The prosecution brought in three physicians who disagreed with the
defense witnesses' testimony that Dr. Lloyd Naramore's treatment was medically
appropriate. Id.
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were within the bounds of good medical practice, and as such the
conviction must be overturned.209
The outcomes of these pain treatment cases seem comparable to those of
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. Studies show that both active
voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide occur frequently, and
yet there are very few prosecutions. 210  It seems reasonable that the
outcomes of physician-assisted suicide cases and medication cases are
similar. In physician-assisted suicide cases when physicians stand trial,
convictions are extremely rare. 211  Juries often ignore the specific
instructions of the judge and revert to a traditional judgment of right and
wrong.212 "In the rare instances when health care providers have been
accused of criminal behavior in using analgesics, the prosecutions or
attempted prosecutions have usually foundered on the difficulty of showing
that the substances in fact hastened death. '213
Given these examples, it is hard to imagine that the Louisiana prosecutor
handling Dr. Pou's case ever believed he stood a good chance of victory.
Unlike the case of Naramore, Dr. Pou did not have much time to think, talk
to family, or prepare a plan of action. Much like Capute, Dr. Pou spoke
about the pain the patients were suffering and the "comfort care" she
provided.214 The role of the extreme emergency situation undoubtedly
makes the prosecutor's job of proving intent to kill much more difficult.
C. The Role of the Extreme Emergency Situation:
The Problem of Finding Intent
There is no legal research available applying the role of intent to the
extreme emergency situation. However, it is easy to understand how
determining intent becomes even more difficult in such a situation. A
physician acting under ordinary circumstances faces difficult decisions, and
undoubtedly that physician's mind is full of both medically based and
compassionate thoughts. However, in that situation, the administration of
the hospital is functioning and all technology, staff, and medication is
standard. In these cases, determining intent may be difficult, but not
impossible.
In an extreme emergency situation, the doctor may not know the patient,
the patient's medical history, the specialty area of the patient's disease, or
even the patient's name.21 5 Furthermore, documentation of medication
209. Id. ("When there is such strong evidence supporting a reasonable, noncriminal
explanation for the doctor's actions, it cannot be said that there is no reasonable doubt of
criminal guilt.").
210. See, e.g., Kay, supra note 120, at 694.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. Cantor & Thomas, supra note 36, at 111.
214. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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dosages is most likely not accounted for.2 16 It is plain that each side of the
double effect argument can be heightened in this situation: The physician
may be acting only with the intent to rid the patient of his or her suffering,
although it is possible that the physician is more likely to intend death
because he or she believes that death in a more painful manner is certain to
occur.
1. Possible Solutions to Consider for the Future
Part II of this Note analyzes the debate over criminalizing risky pain
medication and the intent/double effect standard used to determine
culpability. The role of the extreme emergency situation is analyzed where
possible to understand if and how the debate should change in such horrific
conditions. The arguments presented above provide some basis for the
legal standard that must be used during the extreme emergency situation.
As discussed, the problem is that there is no existing framework for
physicians to follow during an extreme emergency situation. Both the
medical profession and the criminal justice system of each state need to
converge in order to produce the proper standard of care that is to be
expected of physicians during an extreme emergency situation.
a. Medical Judgment as the Law
It is possible that during an extreme emergency situation, medical
judgment should be the law. More specifically, if criminal law should not
interfere with medical judgment, 217 perhaps the law should categorically
except doctors who work during extreme emergency situations from
criminal liability. In thinking that the doctors who leave during such
situations are the problem,218 perhaps the law ought to pay deference to the
doctors who risk their own lives and stay to help during a terrorist attack or
a tsunami. In such a situation, the law could presume that the probability
that the doctor who decides to stay and help patients intends to hurt people
is most likely very low. The medical judgment stance supports the
argument that the medical profession should be shielded from criminal
liability in providing pain medication. 2 19
The opposition to the medical judgment shield argument is that a doctor
who chooses to work during a hurricane or a terrorist attack should in no
way feel leeway to substitute his judgment for that of the patient.
Specifically, even if the doctor believes that death by pain medication
would be preferable to a bombing or drowning, it is not the doctor's
decision to make. Therefore, the categorical exception may allow too much
216. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
217. See Haugen, supra note 74, at 363.
218. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
219. See supra Part II.A.2.a. However, this view is in direct contrast with the view of
some scholars who argue that physicians are experts, know the consequences of their
actions, and therefore intend death. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
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free reign and thus allow physicians with bad intentions to exaggerate the
conditions of an extreme emergency situation to escape criminal liability.
b. The Status Quo
Standing in opposition to the medical judgment approach is the status
quo approach, which embraces the argument that the judicial system is able
to handle such extreme emergency situations because jurors can make the
right judgments based on the facts presented, no matter the situation.220 For
example, the cases presented in Part II.B.2.b demonstrate that in most
situations intent is hard to prove.221 Accordingly, the burden rests on the
government, and physicians generally are not convicted unless their acts are
egregious and they admit to intent to cause death.222 The jury may be best
equipped to handle this determination, as the jury may have been just as
devastated by the extreme emergency as the physician and may understand
the dire situation. Intent may only be found if it was truly present, and the
doctor who intended to ease pain alone will be exonerated. 223 Faith that the
criminal justice system will bring about the proper result may be justified.
c. Finding the Proper Standard During the Extreme Emergency Situation
If risky pain treatment during the extreme emergency situation is
criminalized, as will be assumed for the purposes of this section, the
standard for determining culpability may take one of three varieties: (1)
embracing the doctrine of double effect intent,224 (2) holding the medical
profession to a higher standard of intent,225 (3) or allowing dual intent, both
to ease pain and cause death. 226
Intent, as has been discussed, is a high standard and can have some
practical difficulties. 227 Double effect intent, which embraces the idea that
a physician intends only to ease his patient's pain and not cause death,
allows for the standard to remain high, namely at the level of specific intent,
while also incorporating the policy reasons of patient pain management, 228
which is crucial during the extreme emergency situation. However, as has
been analyzed, the principle of double effect is often opposed as a means of
escaping blame for murder, when in truth the physician did intend death. 229
220. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
221. See, e.g., State v. Naramore, 965 P.2d 211,223 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998).
222. See supra Part II.B.2.b (discussing cases which illustrate the difficulty in obtaining a
conviction).
223. See Naramore, 965 P.2d at 223 (proving that, even if the jury finds intent, a higher
court may be willing to overturn the jury's verdict if the evidence at trial is not explicitly
supportive of a finding of intent).
224. See supra notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
227. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
228. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
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Assuming a higher standard for doctors is another possibility, namely
that physicians understand the consequences of their actions and thus intend
to cause death when administering possibly lethal medications.230 This
argument focuses on the expertise of the profession. However, during an
extreme emergency, a physician, such as Dr. Pou, may try to help patients
outside of his or her specific area of expertise and proper medicine may be
scarce. If this is the case, a higher standard based on the expertise of the
profession does not seem reasonable.
Lastly, a physician may have both the intent to ease suffering and cause
death, as is suggested by Professor Cantor.231 Even though a physician
intends to ease pain, he or she may know that the patient is going to die and
thus remains culpable. During the extreme emergency situation it seems
difficult enough to determine a single intent of the physician, let alone a
double intent. However, a physician may be so flustered by a situation that
he or she is not sure of intent or may possibly intend many things at the
same time.
Part III analyzes whether in extreme circumstances, such as where there
is unbearable heat, flooding, and decomposing bodies, the analysis should
be the same. Should a doctor who risked her life be charged with murder
given such unknowns? On the other hand, does a doctor treating a patient
during extreme conditions deserve special treatment, when some doctors
face these decisions every day, such as when they treat cancer and AIDS
patients?
III. RELIANCE ON THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT
WITH DEFERENCE TO MEDICAL JUDGMENT
The controversy presented by a case like Dr. Pou's and the possibilities
for resolving such a controversy as presented in Part II of this Note
constitute a well-balanced debate. The role of the extreme emergency
situation tips the scale toward a mechanism to provide greater protection for
both patients and physicians. As such, this Note argues that during an
extreme emergency situation, the administration of risky pain medication
must be criminalized based on the standard of double effect intent. Thus,
the status quo should remain, but the principle of double effect should be
expressly adopted, providing deference to the medical judgment of the
physicians who risk their lives during horrific situations such as Hurricane
Katrina. Part III.A presents the reasons that a categorical exception from
criminalization is unworkable as it provides no protection for patients. Part
111.13 explains how the doctrine of double effect is necessary to protect
physicians while still protecting patients.
230. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 76232
TREA TING END OF LIFE PA TIENTS
A. Criminal Law Must Play a Role in Protecting Patients
During the Extreme Emergency Situation
The argument for a categorical exemption 232 holding medical judgment
during an extreme emergency beyond the reach of law is unacceptable.
Shielding a section of society from the criminal justice system is too drastic
and dangerous a course to follow. A state's criminal justice system is in
place and should be respected. The worry that physicians will not
adequately treat pain and may even choose to leave during an extreme
emergency does not tip the debate enough to completely protect all
physicians from the reach of the law. The choice is between a patient
suffering extreme pain or being murdered. As such, there is not much of a
choice.
Furthermore, this argument rests largely on faith in the judicial system.
Prosecutors, as officers of the court, are presumed not to charge people with
meritless crimes. Although there may be times when the system has failed,
the entire system would have to be replaced if prosecutors are not seeking
justice. If society cannot trust prosecutors to proceed only with charges for
which they have sufficient evidence, the criminal justice system, whether
during ordinary times or an emergency, will not function as a safeguard.
Therefore, it should be expected and required that prosecutors act with the
same diligence in trying cases during an extreme emergency situation.
Lastly, the high standard of determining culpability and the low rates at
which physicians are actually investigated and/or charged provide a basis to
accept criminalization. 233 Since physicians are charged very rarely and
found guilty even less often because of the high burden of proof during
normal times, it can be assumed that during an extreme emergency
situation, where prosecutors and juries have also lived through the tragedy
and understand the horrible conditions faced by the doctor, the number of
charges and convictions may be even lower. The story of Dr. Pou is now
the best example of this.
B. Embracing the Doctrine of Double Effect to Protect Physicians
The doctrine of double effect must be embraced by the judicial system as
the arguments for the application of the principle are most pertinent in
dealing with the extreme emergency situation. If a doctor risks his or her
life to attend to the sick and dying during a terrorist attack, there exists
more reason to believe that he or she intended solely to ease suffering and
not to cause death.
As such, criminalizing pain treatment based on the standard of double
effect intent is proper and necessary during the extreme emergency
situation.234 Assuming that a doctor knows for sure that pain medication
232. See supra Part II.C. l.a.
233. See supra notes 210-13 and accompanying text.
234. See, e.g., Grady, supra note 10 ("'It's a narrow gray line. Nobody knows how we
would react under extreme circumstances."' (quoting Dr. Mark Siegler)).
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will hasten death under unbelievably dire circumstances is not acceptable.
As has been described in this Note and by reports worldwide, the extreme
emergency situation caused by Hurricane Katrina left Memorial Medical
Center in utter disarray.235 The patients' regular treating physicians were
not present, the temperature was above 100 degrees, and the smell of dead
bodies permeated the air.236 To assume that any physician can diagnose or
treat a patient with certainty under these extreme circumstances is simply an
assumption that cannot and should not be made. Furthermore, some
deference must be given to the medical profession. A doctor's expertise
should not lead one to assume that he or she knows with certainty, and thus
intends, the consequences of every action. The Supreme Court has
indicated that it supports the principle of double effect. 237 So should
Louisiana and all other states.
Furthermore, only with an acceptance of double effect intent will the
issue of pain and doctor abandonment be addressed. If a doctor's intent to
ease suffering is not accepted by the criminal justice system, the epidemic
of under treatment of pain will only worsen. Furthermore, if a doctor fears
criminal liability for treatment because he or she is assumed to know the
consequences of all of his or her actions, there would be no real reason for
the doctor to continue to treat patients in extreme emergency situations,
thus exacerbating the problem of doctors fleeing during such situations.
CONCLUSION
The case of Dr. Pou and the controversy that surrounded it makes it
obvious that the role of physicians during extreme emergency situations is a
precarious one. These doctors risk their lives in treating patients and,
although not physically injured, must cope with the severe mental anguish
inherent in such horrible situations. Doctors may still fear for their lives, as
hurricanes, terrorist attacks, or other calamities continue and reports of what
is to come remain unclear. Furthermore, their families may also be in
jeopardy. In such a situation, the law must be clear so as to provide a
means of protection and assurance for both patients and doctors. Patients
must receive adequate treatment, and doctors must not be charged for
honestly trying to ease patients' suffering.
In conclusion, aggressive pain medication during the extreme emergency
situation must remain criminalized but culpability must be based on the
double effect intent standard.
235. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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